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Abstract
In this paper we consider quantum interactive proof systems, i.e., interactive proof systems in
which the prover and verifier may perform quantum computations and exchange quantum messages.
It is proved that every language in PSPACE has a quantum interactive proof system that requires
only two rounds of communication between the prover and verifier, while having exponentially small
(one-sided) probability of error. It follows that quantum interactive proof systems are strictly more
powerful than classical interactive proof systems in the constant-round case unless the polynomial
time hierarchy collapses to the second level.
1 Introduction
A number of recent papers have provided compelling evidence (and proof, in some cases) that certain
computational, cryptographic, and information-theoretic tasks can be performed more efficiently by
models based on quantum physics than those based on classical physics. For example, Shor [29] has
shown that integers can be factored in expected polynomial time by quantum computers, a quantum
key distribution protocol of Bennett and Brassard [10] that does not rely on intractability assumptions
has been proven secure under a wide variety of attacks [12, 25, 26], and Buhrman, Cleve, and Wigderson
[13] have shown various separation results between quantum and classical two-party communication
complexity models. In this paper we introduce the quantum analogue of another concept—interactive
proof systems—and provide strong evidence that additional power is gained by interactive proof sys-
tems in the quantum setting.
Interactive proof systems were introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [22] and Babai
[4]. Informally, in an interactive proof system a computationally unbounded prover interacts with a
polynomial-time probabilistic verifier and attempts to convince the verifier to accept a given input
string. A language L is said to have an interactive proof system if there exists a verifier V such that
(i) there exists a prover P (called an honest prover) that can always convince V to accept when the
given input is in L, and (ii) no prover P ′ can convince V to accept with nonnegligable probability
when the input is not in L. The class of languages having interactive proof systems is denoted IP .
Based on the work of Lund, Fortnow, Karloff, and Nisan [24], Shamir [27] proved that every
language in PSPACE has an interactive proof system. Since any language having an interactive proof
system is in PSPACE [20], this implies IP = PSPACE. All known protocols for PSPACE require
a nonconstant number of rounds of communication between the prover and verifier, and cannot be
parallelized to require only a constant number of rounds under the assumption that the polynomial
time hierarchy is proper. This is because the class of languages having constant-round interactive
proof systems is equivalent to the class AM [4, 23], and hence is contained in Πp2.
The main result we prove in this paper is as follows.
Theorem 1 Every language in PSPACE has a 2-round quantum interactive proof system with expo-
nentially small probability of error.
This result contrasts with the facts mentioned above regarding classical interactive proof systems,
as it shows there are languages having 2-round quantum interactive proof systems that do not have
constant-round classical interactive proof systems unless AM = PSPACE.
We now summarize informally our technique for proving Theorem 1. Consider the following (unsuc-
cessful) method for trying to reduce the number of rounds required by a nonconstant-round protocol
for PSPACE to a constant: define the verifier so that it chooses all of its random numbers initially,
sends them all to the prover in one round (or in a constant number of rounds), receives all the re-
sponses from the prover, and checks the validity of the responses. This will not work, since the prover
may cheat by “looking ahead” and basing its responses on random numbers that would have been sent
in later rounds in the nonconstant-round case. However, using interactive proofs based on quantum
physics, this technique can be made to work, as the aforementioned behavior on the part of the prover
can be detected by a quantum verifier. We now sketch the method for doing this—a formal description
of the protocol appears in Section 3.
The prover first sends a superposition of sequences of random numbers and corresponding responses
to the verifier, and the verifier checks that the responses are valid according to a classical protocol
for PSPACE. (It will be shown that the prover cannot cheat by giving the verifier a superposition
that is biased towards certain random sequences—the verifier will be able to later check that the
superposition is close to uniform.) The verifier then chooses randomly one of the positions in the list
of random numbers and responses, sends back to the prover its responses starting at this position in
the list and challenges the prover to invert the computation it performed to obtain these responses.
Let us say that the random numbers and responses up to the chosen position in the list have low-
index, and the remaining random numbers and responses have high-index. The low-index responses,
which were not sent back to the prover in the second round, should now depend only on the low-
index random numbers (for otherwise the prover has cheated). The verifier may now check that
the superposition of high-index random numbers is uniform by performing an appropriately defined
measurement. However, if the prover has cheated by basing its low-index responses on high-index
random numbers, the low-index responses and high-index random numbers will be entangled in a
manner detectable by the verifier; with high probability, the high-index random numbers will fail
the uniformity test. By performing this process itself in parallel a polynomial number of times, the
probability a cheating prover escapes detection is made exponentially small, while the protocol still
requires only two rounds of communication.
The remainder of the paper has the following organization. In Section 2 we formally define quan-
tum interactive proof systems. In Section 3 we prove Theorem 1 by presenting a 2-round quantum
interactive proof system for the quantified Boolean formula problem and proving its correctness. We
conclude with Section 4, which mentions a number of open problems regarding quantum interactive
proofs.
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2 Definition of quantum interactive proof systems
We now give a formal definition of quantum interactive proof systems. We restrict our attention to
constant round quantum interactive proof systems, although the definition is easily extended to a
nonconstant number of rounds. The model for quantum computation that provides a basis for our
definition of quantum interactive proof systems is the quantum circuit model. We will not define quan-
tum circuits or discuss them in detail, as this has been done elsewhere (see Yao [31] and Berthiaume
[11], for example).
A k-round verifier V is a polynomial-time computable mapping V : Σ∗ × {0, . . . , k} → Σ∗, where
each V (x, j) is an encoding of a quantum circuit composed of quantum gates from some appropriately
chosen universal set of gates. Universal sets of gates/transformations have been investigated in a
number of papers [1, 7, 8, 16, 17]; for the purposes of this paper, we will assume only that this set
includes the Walsh-Hadamard gate and any universal gate for reversible computation such as the
Fredkin gate or Toffoli gate. Each encoding V (x, j) is identified with the quantum circuit it encodes.
Since the mapping V is computable in polynomial time, each circuit V (x, j) must be polynomial in
size. The qubits upon which each V (x, j) acts are assumed to be divided into two groups: message
qubits and ancilla qubits. The message qubits represent the communication channel between the
prover and verifier, while the ancilla qubits represent qubits that are private to the verifier. One of
the verifier’s ancilla qubits is specified as the output qubit.
A k-round prover P is a mapping from Σ∗ × {1, . . . , k} to the set of all quantum circuits. No
restrictions are placed on the size of each P (x, j) or on the gates from which these circuits are composed.
Similar to the case of the verifier, the qubits of the prover are divided into message qubits and ancilla
qubits. Note that although the prover is all-powerful in a computational sense (there is no bound
on the complexity of the mapping P or on the size of each P (x, j)), we of course require that the
prover obey the laws of physics! This is enforced by requiring that the prover’s actions correspond to
quantum circuits.
Given a pair (P, V ), we consider a quantum circuit composed in the manner illustrated in Figure 1
(the case k = 2 is shown). The probability that a pair (P, V ) accepts a given input x is defined to
be the probability that an observation of the output qubit in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis yields |1〉 when the
circuits V (x, 0), P (x, 1), V (x, 1), . . . , P (x, k), V (x, k) are applied in sequence as illustrated, assuming
all qubits are initially in the |0〉 state.
Now, we say that a language L has a k-round quantum interactive proof system with error proba-
bility ǫ if there exists a k-round verifier V such that
1. There exists a k-round prover P such that if x ∈ L then (P, V ) accepts x with probability 1.
2. For all k-round provers P ′, if x 6∈ L then (P ′, V ) accepts x with probability at most ǫ.
A few notes regarding the above definition are in order. First, we note that there are a number
of other ways in which we could have defined quantum interactive proof systems, such as a definition
based on quantum Turing machines or a definition requiring that each circuit as above be given by
V (|x|, i) or P (|x|, i), with x supplied as input to each circuit, for example. We have chosen the above
definition because of its simplicity. Given the apparent robustness of the class of “polynomial-time
computable quantum transformations,” we suspect these definitions to be equivalent, although we have
not investigated this question in detail. Second, we assume that each circuit corresponds to a unitary
operator (e.g., no “measurement gates” are used). The action of any general quantum gate (i.e., a
gate corresponding to a trace-preserving, completely positive linear map on mixed states of qubits)
can always be simulated by some unitary gate (possibly adding more ancilla qubits) [2]. As this will
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Figure 1: Quantum circuit for a 2-round quantum interactive proof system
not increase the size of a verifier’s circuit by more than a polynomial factor, and will not affect the
complexity of the mapping V significantly, our definition is equivalent to a definition allowing more
general quantum gates.
3 2-round quantum interactive proof systems for the QBF problem
We begin this section by defining the quantified Boolean formula problem, which is complete for
PSPACE. A quantified Boolean formula is a formula of the form Q1x1 · · ·QnxnB(x1, . . . , xn), where
each Qi is an existential or universal quantifier (∃ or ∀) and B(x1, . . . , xn) is a Boolean formula
(without quantifiers) in the variables x1, . . . , xn. The quantified Boolean formula (QBF) problem is
to determine if a quantified Boolean formula is true.
To prove Theorem 1, it is sufficient to prove that there exists a 2-round quantum interactive proof
system with exponentially small error for the QBF problem. This is because a verifier (and any honest
prover) may first compute a polynomial-time reduction from a given problem in PSPACE to the QBF
problem, then execute the protocol for QBF (adjusting various parameters in the protocol to reduce
error as necessary).
3.1 A classical protocol for QBF
Our 2-round quantum interactive proof system for the QBF problem is based on a variant of the
Lund–Fortnow–Karloff–Nisan protocol due to Shen [28], to which the reader is referred for a detailed
description. In this section we review some facts regarding this protocol that will later be helpful.
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Let us suppose the input formula Q = Q1x1 · · ·QnxnB(x1, . . . , xn) is fixed. Also let F be a finite
field, write N =
(n+1
2
)
+n, and let d be the length of Q (with a slight modification of the protocol, d = 3
is sufficient). The protocol is as follows. For j = 1, . . . , N−1, the prover sends the verifier a polynomial
fj over F of degree at most d, and the verifier chooses rj ∈ F and sends rj to the prover. The prover
then sends a polynomial fN to the verifier in the final round, and the verifier chooses rN ∈ F (there
is no need for rN to be sent to the prover). The verifier then evaluates a particular polynomial-time
predicate E(Q, r1, . . . , rN , f1, . . . , fN ) and accepts if and only if the predicate evaluates to true.
A formal description of E may be derived from the paper of Shen. Since the details of the predicate
are not necessary for our discussion, we will only state certain properties of E. First, for any sequence
of random numbers r1, . . . , rN ∈ F there exist polynomials c1, . . . , cN , where each polynomial cj
depends only on r1, . . . , rj−1, that correspond to the answers that should be given by an honest
prover. These polynomials, which are well-defined regardless of the Boolean value of Q, satisfy the
following properties:
1. If Q evaluates to true, then for all sequences r1, . . . , rN , E(Q, r1, . . . , rN , c1, . . . , cN ) = true.
2. If Q evaluates to false, then for all sequences r1, . . . , rN , E(Q, r1, . . . , rN , c1, f2, . . . , fN ) = false
for all polynomials f2, . . . , fN .
3. If Q evaluates to false, then for any k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} and r1, . . . , rk−1 ∈ F, the following holds.
If f1, . . . , fk are such that fk 6= ck, then there are at most d values of rk for which there exist
rk+1, . . . , rN and fk+2, . . . , fN such that E(Q, r1, . . . , rN , f1, . . . , fk, ck+1, fk+2, . . . , fN ) = true.
4. If Q evaluates to false, then for any r1, . . . , rN−1 and f1, . . . , fN for which fN 6= cN , there are at
most d values of rN for which E(Q, r1, . . . , rN , f1, . . . , fN ) = true.
For given r1, . . . , rk−1, we call the polynomial ck the correct polynomial corresponding to r1, . . . , rk−1.
Clearly, ifQ evaluates to true, an honest prover can always convince the verifier to accept by sending
the correct polynomials c1, . . . , cN corresponding to the verifiers random numbers r1, . . . , rN−1.
Now suppose that Q evaluates to false. By item 2, a cheating prover cannot send the correct
polynomial c1 on the first round, for the prover rejects with certainty in this case. Hence the prover
must send f1 6= c1 if the verifier is to accept. Now suppose for k ∈ {1, . . . , N −1} and r1, . . . , rk−1 the
prover has sent polynomials f1 6= c1, . . . , fk 6= ck during rounds 1, . . . , k. Unless the verifier randomly
chooses one of d particular values for rk, the prover may not send ck+1 on the next round without
causing the verifier to reject. Hence, if the prover sends an incorrect polynomial on round k, then with
probability at least 1−d/|F| it must send an incorrect polynomial on round k+1. Finally, if the prover
does not send the correct polynomial cN during the last round, the verifier accepts with probability
at most d/|F|. Hence, the total probability that the verifier accepts may not exceed (dN)/|F|.
Since the error probability of the protocol depends on the size of F, F may be chosen sufficiently
large at the start of the protocol. It will be convenient for us to take F to be the field with 2k ele-
ments for k polynomial in n (hence yielding exponentially small probability of error). For any chosen
k, the verifier (and honest prover) may use a deterministic procedure to implement arithmetic in
F—specifically, compute an irreducible polynomial g of degree k over GF (2) in deterministic polyno-
mial time [30], identify elements of F with polynomials over GF (2) of degree at most k − 1, and take
arithmetic to be the usual arithmetic on polynomials modulo g. There is thus a natural correspondence
between k bit strings and elements of F.
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3.2 Quantum verifier’s protocol for QBF
We now describe the verifier’s protocol for our 2-round quantum interactive proof system for the QBF
problem.
We use the following conventions when describing the quantum circuits corresponding to the veri-
fier’s actions. Collections of qubits upon which various transformations are performed are referred to
as registers, and are labeled by capital letters in boldface. The registers required by the protocol are
Ri,j , Si,j , and Fi,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ N , where N is as in the classical protocol described
in Section 3.1 and m is some polynomial in n specified depending on the desired error as described
below. Each register Ri,j and Si,j consists of k qubits, where 2
k is to be the size of the field F. We
view the classical states of these registers as elements in F in the usual way. Each Fi,j consists of
d + 1 collections of k qubits, for d as in the classical protocol, and we view the classical states of
these registers as polynomials of degree at most d with coefficients in F. The verifier may also use any
polynomial number of additional ancilla qubits in order to perform the transformations described. In
addition, the verifier will store the vector u and any auxiliary variables needed for the protocol—as
there will be no need for the verifier to perform quantum operations on these values, we consider them
as being stored classically (although there is no difference in the behavior of the protocol if they are
thought of as being stored in quantum registers).
The error probability of the protocol will depend on m and k as described below in Section 3.3—we
may take m and k to be fixed polynomials in n to obtain exponentially small error.
It will be convenient to refer to certain collections of the quantum registers mentioned above;
for a given vector u ∈ {1, . . . , N}m we let R(u) be the collection of registers Ri,1, . . . ,Ri,ui−1 for
i = 1, . . . ,m, and we let F(u) be the collection of registers Fi,1, . . . ,Fi,ui for i = 1, . . . ,m. See
Figure 2 for an example. We also letRi and Fi denote the vectors (Ri,1, . . . ,Ri,N ) and (Fi,1, . . . ,Fi,N ),
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
R F
R(u) F(u)
R(u) F(u)
Figure 2: Example division of R and F for N = 8, m = 5, and u = (6, 4, 7, 2, 5).
respectively.
The verifier’s protocol is described in Figure 3. The check in step 1 refers to the classical protocol
described in Section 3.1. Naturally this check is performed by reversibly computing the predicate E
(described in Section 3.1), so as not to alter superpositions of valid pairs (R,F ). The transformation
H⊗k in step 4 is the Walsh-Hadamard transform applied to each qubit of the register in question,
where
H : |0〉 7→ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and H : |1〉 7→ 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)
as usual. The random choice of the vector u in step 2 can be simulated efficiently with negligible error
using the Walsh-Hadamard transform appropriately. (Note that this negligible error will not change
the fact that the protocol has one-sided error.)
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1. Receive quantum registers R and F from the prover. Reject if (Ri,Fi) contain an invalid proof
that the input formula Q evaluates to true for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
2. Choose u ∈ {1, . . . , N}m uniformly at random and send u and F(u) to the prover.
3. Receive S from the prover and subtract Ri,j from Si,j for each i, j.
4. Apply transformation H⊗k to each register ofR(u). IfR(u) now contains only 0 values, then accept,
otherwise reject.
Figure 3: Quantum verifier’s protocol for the QBF problem.
3.3 Proof of correctness
We now prove that the above protocol is correct. First we show that there exists an honest prover P
such that (P, V ) accepts with certainty whenever the input formula Q evaluates to true.
Given QBF Q and m×N matrix R of elements in F, let C(R) denote the corresponding matrix of
correct polynomials as defined in Section 3.1. For each i, C(R)i,1, . . . , C(R)i,N is thus the sequence of
polynomials the honest prover returns in the classical protocol given random numbers Ri,1, . . . , Ri,N .
The honest (quantum) prover first prepares superposition
2−kmN/2
∑
R
|R〉|C(R)〉
in registers R and F, adds the contents of each register Ri,j to Si,j, and sends R and F to the verifier.
Under the assumption Q is true, each pair (Ri, Fi) the verifier receives is a valid pair with respect to
the classical protocol, so the verifier will not reject in step 1.
The behavior of the honest prover in the second round is as follows. For each i, j, let Ti,j be a
unitary transformation such that
Ti,j : |R〉|0〉 7→ |R〉|C(R)i,j〉.
Upon receiving u and F(u) in the second round, the prover applies transformation T−1i,j to S together
with Fi,j for each appropriate pair i, j. This returns each register of F
(u) to its initial zero value. The
prover then sends S to the verifier. It may be checked that after subtracting each Ri,j from Si,j, the
registers R(u) will not be entangled with any other registers (as each register of F(u) depends only on
those of R(u)), and are in a uniform superposition over all possible values. Thus, each register of R(u)
is put into state 0 during step 4, and hence the verifier accepts with certainty.
Now we show that the verifier accepts with exponentially small probability in case Q is false,
given any prover. We begin by examining the total state of the prover and verifier as the protocol is
executed. In step 1 the prover sends registers R and F to the verifier. The state of the system at this
point may be expressed as
|ψ〉 =
∑
R,F
α(R,F )|R〉|F 〉|ξ(R,F )〉,
where each α(R,F ) is a complex number and |ξ(R,F )〉 is a normalized vector representing the state
of the prover’s ancilla registers (which may be entangled with R and F in any manner the prover
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chooses). Since the verifier rejects any pair R,F for which each (Ri, Fi) is not a valid proof that Q
is true, we may assume |ψ〉 is a superposition over such valid pairs for the purposes of bounding the
probability that the verifier accepts.
At this point, let us associate with each register Ri,j and each register Fi,j a random variable.
The probabilities with which each random variable takes a particular value is precisely the probability
that an observation of the associated register yields the given value, assuming that the observation
takes place while the entire system is in state |ψ〉 above. As we have done above for registers, we may
consider collections of random variables as being single random variables, abbreviated by R(u), F(u),
etc. For example,
Pr[R = R, F(u) = F (u)] =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
F (u)
α(R,F )|F (u)〉|ξ(R,F )〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
We also define a number of events based on these random variables. Recall the definition of C(R)
from above (i.e., C(R) is the m×N matrix of correct polynomials an honest prover answers for given
R). For 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, define Ai,j to be the event that Fi,j′ does not contain C(R)i,j′
for j′ ≤ j and Fi,j+1 does contain C(R)i,j+1, for R denoting the contents of R. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
define Ai,N to be the event that Fi,j′ does not contain C(R)i,j′ for every j
′. Note that we must have
Pr[Ai,1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ai,N ] = 1 for each i, as the verifier surely rejects in step 1 if Fi,1 contains C(R)i,1.
Finally, for each v ∈ {1, . . . , N}m define events Bv and Dv as Bv =
⋃
iAi,vi and Dv =
⋂
iAi,vi .
In step 2 the verifier chooses u randomly and sends u and F(u) to the prover. The prover applies
some transformation to its registers (now including F(u)), sends some register S to the verifier, and
the verifier subtracts the contents of R from S. The state of the system may now be described by∑
R,F (u)
β(R,u, F (u))|R〉|F (u)〉|η(R,u, F (u))〉,
where each β(R,u, F (u)) is a complex number and |η(R,u, F (u))〉 is a normalized vector describing the
state of the prover’s registers as well as register S.
The verifier now executes step 4. Assuming for now that u is fixed, this results in acceptance with
probability∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
R,F (u)
β(R,u, F (u))|R(u)〉〈0 |H⊗k |R1,u1〉 · · · 〈0 |H⊗k |Rm,um〉|F (u)〉|η(R,u, F (u))〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= 2−lk
∑
R(u),F (u)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
R(u)
β(R,u, F (u))|η(R,u, F (u))〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
where l denotes the number of registers to which H⊗k was applied, i.e., l =
∑m
i=1(n− ui +1). By the
triangle inequality, this probability is at most
2−lk
∑
R(u),F (u)

∑
R(u)
∣∣∣β(R,u, F (u))∣∣∣


2
. (1)
We now derive an upper bound on (1) by considering the random variables defined above. First,
we state a definition and prove a lemma regarding this definition that will be useful for this task.
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Definition 1 For any nonempty, finite set S and mapping f : S → R+, define
θS(f) =
1
|S|
(∑
s∈S
√
f(s)
)2
.
Lemma 1 Let f, g : S → R+ satisfy ∑s∈S f(s) ≤ 1 and ∑s∈S g(s) ≤ 1, let λ ∈ [0, 1], and let
r = |{s ∈ S|f(s) = 0}|/|S|. Then
θS(λf + (1− λ)g) ≤ 1− λr + 2
√
1− r.
Proof. First note that for any set T ⊆ S and function h : T → R+ with ∑s∈T h(s) ≤ 1, we have
∑
s∈T
√
h(s) ≤
√
|T |
√∑
s∈T
h(s)
by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and hence θT (h) ≤ 1. Now define S′ = {s ∈ S|f(s) = 0}. We have
√
θS(λf + (1− λ)g) = 1√|S|
∑
s∈S
√
λf(s) + (1− λ)g(s)
=
√
(1− λ)r√
|S′|
∑
s∈S′
√
g(s) +
√
1− r√
|S\S′|
∑
s∈S\S′
√
λf(s) + (1− λ)g(s)
=
√
(1− λ)r
√
θS′(g) +
√
1− r
√
θS\S′(λf + (1− λ)g)
≤
√
(1− λ)r +√1− r.
Thus θS(λf + (1− λ)g) ≤ 1− λr + 2
√
(1− λ)r(1− r) ≤ 1− λr + 2√1− r as claimed.
Now, note that ∣∣∣β(R,u, F (u))∣∣∣2 = Pr [R = R, F(u) = F (u)]
for each R and F (u); the actions of the prover and verifier are norm-preserving, and hence will not
affect the probabilities corresponding to each R and F (u). Thus (1) may be rewritten
2−lk
∑
R(u),F (u)

∑
R(u)
√
Pr
[
R = R,F(u) = F (u)
]
2
. (2)
For each pair R(u), F (u), define a mapping XR(u),F (u) : F
l → [0, 1] as follows:
XR(u),F (u)
(
R(u)
)
= Pr
[
R
(u) = R(u)
∣∣∣R(u) = R(u),F(u) = F (u) ] .
The probability in (2) may be written as∑
R(u),F (u)
Pr
[
R
(u) = R(u),F(u) = F (u)
]
θF l(XR(u) ,F (u)). (3)
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Define YR(u),F (u) : F
l → [0, 1] and ZR(u),F (u) : F l → [0, 1] as follows:
YR(u),F (u)
(
R(u)
)
= Pr
[
R
(u) = R(u)
∣∣∣R(u) = R(u), F(u) = F (u), Bu] ,
ZR(u),F (u)
(
R(u)
)
= Pr
[
R
(u) = R(u)
∣∣∣R(u) = R(u), F(u) = F (u), ¬Bu] ,
for events Bu and ¬Bu defined previously. We have
θF l(XR(u),F (u)) = θF l
(
λu YR(u),F (u) + (1− λu)ZR(u),F (u)
)
.
for λu = Pr
[
Bu
∣∣R(u) = R(u),F(u) = F (u) ].
Now consider the values of R(u) for which YR(u),F (u)
(
R(u)
)
= 0; we claim the number of such
values is at least
(
1− dm2−k) 2kl for every R(u), F (u). This may be argued as follows. First, fix values
for R(u), F (u), and i, and assume event Ai,ui takes place. By the properties of the classical protocol
discussed in Section 3.1, there are at most d values of Ri,ui that do not cause the classical protocol to
reject in this case. Thus, the number of values of R(u) for which
Pr
[
R
(u) = R(u)
∣∣∣R(u) = R(u), F(u) = F (u), Ai,ui] 6= 0
is at most d 2k(l−1). Since we have
0 ≤ YR(u),F (u)
(
R(u)
)
≤
m∑
i=1
Pr
[
R
(u) = R(u)
∣∣∣R(u) = R(u), F(u) = F (u), Ai,ui] ,
the total number of values of R(u) for which YR(u),F (u)
(
R(u)
) 6= 0 is at most dm2k(l−1).
Now we may apply Lemma 1 to obtain
θF l
(
XR(u),F (u)
)
≤ 1− Pr
[
Bu
∣∣∣R(u) = R(u),F(u) = F (u) ] (1− dm2−k)+ 2√dm2−k,
and hence∑
R(u),F (u)
Pr
[
R
(u) = R(u),F(u) = F (u)
]
θF l
(
XR(u),F (u)
)
≤ 1− Pr[Bu]
(
1− dm2−k
)
+ 2
√
dm2−k. (4)
It remains to bound (4), given that u is chosen uniformly from {1, . . . , N}m. Let U denote the
random variable corresponding to the verifier’s choice of u. We bound Pr[BU ] by conditioning on the
events Dv that describe the exact places where the prover tries to “sneak in” the correct polynomials.
Specifically, we have
Pr[BU ] =
∑
u
Pr[Bu] Pr[U = u] = N
−m
∑
u,v
Pr[Bu|Dv] Pr[Dv]
= N−m
∑
v
(Nm − (N − 1)m) Pr[Dv] = 1−
(
1− 1
N
)m
> 1− e−m/N .
Thus, the overall probability that the verifier accepts is at most
1−
(
1− e−m/N
) (
1− dm2−k
)
+ 2
√
dm2−k.
By initially choosing m and k to be sufficiently fast growing polynomials in the input size |x| (e.g.,
m = (|x|+1)N and k = 2|x|+6+ ⌈log(dm)⌉), this probability may be made smaller than 2−|x|, which
completes the proof.
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4 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have defined in this paper a natural quantum analogue of the notion of an interactive proof system,
and proved that there exist 2-round quantum interactive proof systems with exponentially small error
for any PSPACE language. We do not know if constant-round quantum interactive proofs characterize
PSPACE, or if there are such proof systems for (presumably) larger classes (e.g., does NEXP have
constant-round quantum interactive proofs?). We have investigated neither the polynomial round case
nor the k-round case for k > 2; what languages have such quantum proof systems?
Several variants on interactive proof systems have been studied, such as multiprover interactive
proofs [5, 9, 14, 19, 21], probabilistically checkable proofs [3, 21], and interactive proof systems having
verifiers with very limited computing power [15, 18]. How do quantum analogues of these models
compare with their classical counterparts?
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